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Abstract:
In this paper we estimate nonlinear Taylor rules over the 1986–2008 sample time period and augment the tra-
ditional Taylor rule by including principal components to better model Federal Reserve policy. Including prin-
cipal components is useful in that they extract information about the overall economy from multiple economic
indicators in a statistically optimal way. Additionally, given that uncertainty may influence Federal Reserve de-
cisions, we incorporate an uncertainty index in the reaction function of the Federal Reserve.We find substantial
evidence that the Federal Reserve responded to increases in macroeconomic uncertainty by cutting the Federal
Funds rate over the sample period. We also find evidence that the Federal Reserve responded aggressively to
increases in capacity utilization, especially when the inflation rate was above 2%.
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1 Introduction
Since Taylor’s seminal 1993 “Taylor Rule” paper, the empirical monetary policy literature has developed nu-
merous Taylor rules that forecast the federal funds rate based upon a measure of inflation, the output gap, and
usually lags of the federal funds rate. However, Nobay and Peel (2003), Cukierman and Gerlach (2003), Gerlach
(2003), and Ruge-Murcia (2002, 2004), Bec, Salem, and Collard (2002), Dolado, Dolores, and Naveira (2005), and
Surico (2007a) argue that central bank preferences are likely not to be symmetric in their responses to devia-
tions from inflation and output gap targets. If, for example, the Fed is more concerned about unemployment
being substantially above the natural rate rather than below the natural rate or if the Fed cares more about high
inflation rather than low inflation, the Taylor rule feedback rule will not be linear. Schaling (1999) and Dolado,
Dolores, and Naveira (2005) provide a second rationale for a nonlinear Taylor rule. If the aggregate supply
curve is convex, so that there is a non- linear relationship between output and inflation, the optimal feedback
rule relating interest rates to output and inflation should also be nonlinear. Qin and Enders (2008) and Bunzel
and Enders (2010) find substantial evidence that the Taylor rule is non-linear. Specifically, Bunzel and Enders
(2010) argue that the Federal Reserve actually follows an “opportunistic policy” in which the Federal Reserve
takes advantage of a low inflation rates (due to recessions or positive supply shocks) to support trend growth
at the prevailing inflation rate. Bunzel and Enders (2010) argue that such an “opportunistic policy” implies a
nonlinear, rather than a linear policy rule.
Our aim in this paper is to build upon the Bunzel and Enders’ (2010) framework. Our primary interest is in
evaluating whether an output or employment principal component in the Taylor rule provides a better fit than
the traditional output gap. We estimate a nonlinear Taylor rule using inflation as measured by the Personal
Consumption Expenditures (PCE) index, an output principal component, and an employment principal com-
ponent to model Federal Reserve behavior. The rationale behind our principal components approach is that the
Federal Reserve likely takes advantage of a large amount of information in a variety of data series to study the
economic conditions in order to form its policy responses. For example, while the Federal Reserve has explicitly
targeted a 2% inflation rate in the PCE index, they have not specified an output or employment target. The clos-
est the Federal Reserve has come in announcing an output target was in 2013 when Chairman Bernanke stated
that an unemployment rate at 6.5% was a “threshold, not a trigger” for the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) to evaluate whether it was appropriate to adjust policy. Moreover, he additionally stated that asset
purchases would likely come to an end when the unemployment rate was in the vicinity of 7%. However, he
was forced to back away from the unemployment rate targets due to an unexpected fall in the unemployment
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rate despite weak economic growth and stated, “the unemployment rate is not necessarily a great measure, in
all circumstances, of the state of the labor market overall.”
Given that the Federal Reserve examines a broad array of labor market variables in determining the appro-
priate prescription for monetary policy, employing factor analysis as a tool to forecast monetary policy may be
useful in that principal components capture information from multiple economic variables. In this sense, our
work is related to Favero, Marcellino, and Neglia (2005) who, focuses on the inflation part of the policy rule
and employs factors as a proxy for the Federal Reserve’s inflation expectation based on multiple economic data
series. We instead focus on the real economic activity in the policy rule given that the Federal Reserve explicitly
targets PCE inflation. Additionally, given that uncertainty may influence Federal Reserve decisions, we incor-
porate the Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015) uncertainty index in the reaction function of the Federal Reserve.
Moreover, we also allow lags of the output and employment principal components and the uncertainty index
to serve as the threshold variable in our nonlinear models.
As a preview of our results we find evidence that the Federal Reserve responded aggressively to increases
in capacity utilization, especially when the inflation rate is above 2%. We find substantial evidence suggesting
that the Federal Reserve follows a nonlinear Taylor rule and that lagged inflation served as the best threshold
variable. Our estimates of the inflation threshold were 2.02% when using PCE inflation in the estimated Taylor
rules. We find that nonlinear Taylor rules have a better out-of-sample fit than linear versions.
Our results have some poicy implications. For example, we find that the responses of the Federal Reserve
to the output gap and capacity utilization are both insignificant when the inflation rate is below the threshold
value 2.02%. This suggest that Federal Reserve does not respond as aggressively to the output target variable
when the inflation rate is low relative to when inflation is hight.
Additionally, we incorporate an uncertainty index into the reaction function of the Federal Reserve. We find
substantial evidence that the Federal Reserve responded to increases in macroeconomic uncertainty by cutting
the Federal Funds rate over the sample period.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide an in-depth literature review. Section
3 describes the data we use in our analysis. Section 4 estimates and compares several linear and nonlinear
specifications of the Taylor rule and Section 5 concludes.
2 Reviewof literature
Taylor’s (1993) seminal work launched an enourmous literature that examines changes in the federal funds rate
by changes in the inflation and the output gap [Stuart (1996), Poole (1999), and Taylor (1999a, 1999b); Gerlach
and Schnabel (2000), Asso and Leeson (2012), and Kahn (2012)]. Moreoever, many subsequent studies have
shown that the implicit adoption of Taylor rule by the Federal Reserve beginning in the 1980s had a major ef-
fect on stabilizing the U.S. economy [Bernanke (2004, 2012), Stock and Watson (2003), Summers (2005), Boivin
and Giannoni (2006), Siegfried (2010), and Taylor (2012, 2013). Many subsequent extensions of Taylor-type rule
introduced forward-looking expectations of central banks (Clarida, Gali & Gertler 1998; 1999; 2000))] as well as
the critical use of real timedata by central banks in policy analysis andprescriptionsOrphanides (2001). As such,
many forward-looking financial variables that capture macroeconomic expectations have been examined in the
context of Taylor rules [Bernanke and Gertler (1999), (2001), Cecchetti et al. (2000), Chadha, Sarno, and Valente
(2004), Fourcans and Vranceanu (2004), Driffill et al. (2006), Fendel and Frenkel (2006), Lubik and Schorfheide
(2007), Sauer and Sturm (2007), and Surico (2007b)].
Additionally, Svensson (2000, 2003) presents a significant argument in favor of including the exchange rate
as a variable in the Taylor rule. Ball (1999) and Debelle (1999) argue that the inclusion of the exchange rate in the
monetary policy rule plays a significant rol in reducing output and inflation rate predictability; however, Lubik
and Schorfheide (2007) find that this result is not consistent among all developed economies. In a similar vein,
Taylor (2000, 2001), Edwards (2007), Mishkin (2007), and Garcia, Restrepo, and Roger (2011) argue exchange
rates may only need to be included in monetary policy rules for emerging countries. Other studies investigate
the impact and role that financial asset prices may play in explaining the central bank’s behavior. Cecchetti et
al. (2000), Borio and Lowe (2002), Goodhart andHofmann (2002), Sack and Rigobon (2003), Chadha, Sarno, and
Valente (2004), and Rotondi andVaciago (2005) argue that central banks should take into account the effects that
asset price changes may have on the macroeconomy when setting central bank policies; Bernanke and Gertler
(1999, 2001) and Bullard and Schaling (2002) argue that a central bank should only consider the inflationary
effects of asset price changes when setting interest rate policy rather than the effect of asset price changes on
the macroeconomy as a whole. Interestingly, Disyatat (2010) argues that financial stability should explicitly be
taken into the central bank’s loss function. Driffill et al. (2006) finds evidence that the inclusion of financial
stability improves the econometric fit of the Taylor rule. In the same line, Montagnoli and Napolitano (2005)
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develop a financial indicator composed of the exchange rate, equitymarkets and house prices and finds that the
inclusion of these variables improve the econometric description of themonetary policy. Shrestha and Semmler
(2015) focus on five Asian economies and find that the inclusion of a financial instability measure improves the
Taylor rule.
One common issue with the estimation of any Taylor rule is the uncertainty regarding the precise measure-
ment of unobservable variables, such as potential outputMcCallum (1999). Orphanides (2002) and Orphanides
and Van Norden (2002) present convincing evidence that systematic errors in the forecasting of the output-gap
lead to mistaken monetary policy prescription. Moreoever, aside from the measurement error, many authors
argue that the monetary policy using the Taylor rule is better described using nonlinear rather than a linear
specifications. With respect to non-linearities in the Taylor-rule, there are two primary ways in which non-
linearity may arise. Schaling (1999), Svensson (1999), Nobay and Peel (2003), and Dolado, Dolores, and Naveira
(2005) and others suggest that uncertainty and non-linearity in the underlying macroeconomic structure may
provide a compelling case for the use of nonlinear Taylor rule. Moreoever, Schaling (1999) and Dolado, Dolores,
and Naveira (2005) argue that in the presence of a convex aggregate supply curve, a nonlinear feed rule would
be optimal. In addition, Meyer, Swanson, and Wieland (2001), Swanson (2006), and Tillmann (2011) also argue
that uncertainty about the appropriate variable selection, appropriate model specification of the macroecon-
omy and the nature of the monetary transmission mechanism could also lead to a nonlinear Taylor rule. Bec,
Salem, and Collard (2002), Cukierman and Gerlach (2003), Nobay and Peel (2003), Ruge-Murcia (2004), Martin
and Milas (2004), Kim, Osborn, and Sensier (2005), Taylor and Davradakis (2006), and Surico (2007a, 2007b),
Petersen (2007), Cukierman and Muscatelli (2008), Hayat and Mishra (2010), and Castro (2011) also argue that
the Taylor rule could be better specified as a non-linear relationship if central banks have asymmetric responses
to positive and negative deviations in the inflation and output gap. Caporale et al. (2016) estimates a Threshold
Autoregressive (TAR), exchange rate-augmented Taylor rule specification for five inflation targeting, emerg-
ing countries and find substantial evidence for non-linearity in the conduct of monetary policy. In addition,
they also find that most of the central banks react to deviations in real exchange rates. Orphanides and Wilcox
(2002) note that non-linearity in the Taylor rule may result if central banks react only to “large” deviations in
inflation. Aksoy et al. (2006) provides evidence to support this claim. Interestingly, Martin and Milas (2004)
finds that the Bank of England (BOE) reacts stronger to positive deviations from their inflation target over the
period 1992–2000 time period. In a similar fashion, Petersen (2007) estimates a smooth transition logistic re-
gression model of Federal Reserve behavior over the period 1985–2005 time period and finds that the Federal
Reserve reacts stronger to inflation than to output deviations. However, Qin and Enders (2008) do not find
any non-linearity in Federal Reserve’s monetary policy over the 1987–2005 period once interest rate smoothing
and forward-looking behavior of the Federal Reserve is taken into account. Castro (2011) finds that European
Central Bank (ECB) reacts to inflation only when inflation itself is above 2.5 percent and reacts to output gap
deviations afterwards.
Because the Taylor rule is a description of the central bank’s behavior, it is not unreasonable to believe
that the coefficients of the Taylor rule may change over time. Judd and Rudebusch (1998) is a seminal paper
demonstrating the possibility of time varying parameters (TVP) in the Taylor rule. Cogley and Sargent (2001),
Canova and Gambetti (2004), and Mesonnier and Renne (2007) estimate Vector Autoregressive models (VARs)
with aKalman Filter to estimate a TVPTaylor rule to illustrate the time-varying nature of Taylor rule parameters.
Orphanides and Williams (2005) and Sims and Zha (2006) also document time-variation in the parameters of
Taylor rules using a VAR model. Elkhoury (2006), Kuzin (2006), and Trecroci and Vassalli (2006) shows that
TVP of Taylor rules outperform Taylor rules with fixed parameters for a substantial number of developed and
non-developed countries. Jalil (2004), Boivin and Giannoni (2006), and Kim and Nelson (2006) use the Kalman
Filter to illustrate that parameters of the Taylor rule change gradually over time. Moreover, Kim and Nelson
(2006) find evidence of at least three changes in the Fed’s reaction to inflation since 1970s.
In addition to VARs and Kalman Filters, other papers document the time varying nature of the Taylor rule
using Markov switching models, smoothing splines and GMM framework [Wesche (2003), (2006), Owyang
and Ramey (2004), Bae, Kim, and Kim (2012), and Partouche (2007)]. Dueker, Owyang, and Sola (2010) argues
that changes inmacroeconomic conditions, central banks limirations and changes in reference threshold values
would also result in TVP-type Taylor rules. In that vein, Zhu and Chend (2017) examine the non-linearity in
monetary policy of the Federal Reserve using data for the period 1955–2015 using the unemployment rate as a
threshold variable and find evidence of regime dependent asymmetry for the US.
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3 Data
Our primary extensions of Bunzel and Enders’ (2010) model are as follows. First, given that Bernanke an-
nounced a specific inflation target of 2% in PCE inflation, we use the PCE inflation rate rather than the GDP
deflator. Second, because Bernanke does not explicitly announce a target for employment or output, we em-
ploy an output principal component as well as an employment principal component in place of the real-time
output gap (yt) in (1). Third, whereas Bunzel and Enders (2010) employ lags of the output gap and inflation
as threshold variables (xt), we believe that because Bernanke states that the FOMC evaluates a broad range of
employment and output variables in making monetary policy decisions, an output or employment principal
component may serve as a better threshold variable rather than lags of the traditional Taylor rule variables.
Fourth, given the recent importance of macroeconomic uncertainty, we include Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015)
uncertainty index in the reaction function as well include it a potential threshold variable.
In order to extract an output and employment principal component, we utilize the new macroeconomic
dataset developed by McCracken and Serena (2016). McCracken and Serena (2016) develop a large (135 vari-
ables), monthly dataset that has several appealing features that spans the 1960–2015 time period. First, the
dataset can be updated in real-time using the FRED database; second, the dataset is publicly available. Mc-
Cracken and Serena (2016) split up the variables into 8 groups: output and income, labor market, consumption
and orders, orders and inventories, money and credit, interest rates and exchange rates, prices, and the stock
market. As noted above, our primary interest is in evaluating whether an output or employment principal
component in the Taylor rule provides a better fit than the traditional output gap. As such, we use the vari-
ables in the output and income group and the variables in the labor market group to generate an output and
employment principal component. The variables included in the output principal component were the follow-
ing: real personal income (RPI), real personal income excluding transfer receipts (W875RX1), (IPFPNSS) IP:
Final Products and Nonindustrial Supplies, (IPFINAL) IP: Final Products, (IPCONGD) IP: Consumer Goods,
(IPDCONGD) IP: Durable Consumer Goods, (IPNCONGD) IP: Nondurable Consumer Goods, (IPBUSEQ) IP:
Business Equipment, (IPMAT) IP: Materials, (IPDMAT) IP: Durable Materials, (IPNMAT) IP: Nondurable Ma-
terials, (IPMANSICS) IP: Manufacturing, (IPB51222s) IP: Residential Utilities, (IPFUELS) IP: Fuels, ISM manu-
facturing (NAPMPI), and capacity utilization (CUMFNS). The variables used in the employment factor were:
help wanted index (HWI), ratio of help wanted / number of unemployed (HWIURATIO), civilian labor force
(CLF16OV), civilian employment (CE16OV) all employees: total nonfarm (PAYEMS), all employees: goods pro-
ducing (USGOOD), (CES1021000001) All Employees: Mining and Logging: Mining, (USCONS) All Employ-
ees: Construction, (MANEMP) All Employees: Manufacturing, (DMANEMP) All Employees: Durable goods,
(NDMANEMP) All Employees: Nondurable goods, (SRVPRD) All Employees: Service-Providing Industries,
(USTPU) All Employees: Trade, Transportation & Utilities, (USWTRADE) All Employees: Wholesale Trade,
(USTRADE) All Employees: Retail Trade, (USFIRE) All Employees: Financial Activities, (USGOVT) All Em-
ployees: Government.
In order to generate the principal components, we attempt to make the components as real time as possible.
That is, beginning with t = 1979:1, we extract out a principal component using data that only spans the 1960:1
through t time period. We construct the principal components time series by adding one quarter of data. That
is, for the 1979:2 principal component observations, uses data that spans the 1960:1 though 1979:2 time period.
We subsequently repeat that process through the end of our sample.
Recently, numerous articles examining the macroeconomic effects of macroeconomic uncertainty have de-
veloped. Specifically, Bloom’s (2009), Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015) and Sim, Zakrajsek, and Gilchrist (2010)
develop models in which uncertainty shocks adversely affect output. Recently, Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012)
addressed this by developing a policy-related uncertainty index. We include this uncertainty index for two rea-
sons. First, manymarket participants and academicians argued in favor of a “Greenspan put.” The “Greenspan
put” was essentially a belief that if financial markets or macroeconomic conditions became volatile, Chairman
Greenspan would lower interest rates to lower uncertainty and volatility. Thus, our aim is to include the new
Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012) uncertainty index in the Federal Reserve’s reaction function and include the
uncertainty as a potential threshold variable. Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012) spans the 1985Q1 – present time
period. As such, all of our estimations span the 1985Q1–2008Q2 time period. We chose to end our sample pe-
riod in the 2008Q2 due to the beginning of the financial crisis in the third quarter of 2008.1 Table 1 displays
the summary statistics of the main variables that we are used in our analysis. The summary statistics for the
variables displayed in Table 1 cover our sample period from (1985Q1–2008Q2). Also, it is important to note that
all of the variables used in our analysis were pre-tested for unit roots to ensure stationarity; all unit root tests
may be obtained upon request of the authors.
4
Brought to you by | Davidson College Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 2/22/18 6:45 PM
A
ut
om
at
ic
al
ly
ge
ne
ra
te
d
ro
ug
h
PD
F
by
Pr
oo
fC
he
ck
fr
om
R
iv
er
Va
lle
y
Te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
Lt
d
DEGRUYTER Ma et al.
Table 1: Summary statistics (1985Q1–2008Q2).
Variable Mean Max Min SD
Inflation 2.55 4.38 0.76 0.9.
Output gap 0.14 2.46 −2.75 1.04
Federal funds rate 5.04 9.73 1.00 2.18
Uncertainty index 98.2 158.53 63.11 21.75
Output PC 0.002 0.83 −0.62 0.28
Labor PC −0.05 0.45 −0.61 0.19
Capacity utilization −0.01 0.62 −0.84 0.28
4 Results
4.1 Linear Taylor rule estimates
All variables used to extract out principal components were transformed to ensure they were stationary before
we produced the output and employment factors. The top panel of Figure 1 displays the output principal com-
ponent measured on the left hand axis and the real-time output gap [as estimated in Bunzel and Enders (2010)]
measured on the right-hand axis; likewise, the bottom panel of Figure 1 displays the employment principal
component measured on the left-hand axis and the real-time output gap measured on the right hand side.
Figure 1: Ouput gap and output factor.
As a preliminary analysis and a baseline, we first estimate a traditional linear Taylor rule over the
1985Q1–2008Q2 time period. That is, we estimate the following:
𝑖𝑡 = (𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜋𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑦𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜀t) (1)
where πt is the PCE inflation rate, yt is the real time output gap as defined in Bunzel and Enders (2010).
2 The
coefficient estimates as well as the AIC are displayed in the top panel of Table 2. Note in the top panel of Table 2,
that the coefficients on the output gap and inflation rate are positive and statistically significant at conventional
levels. Moreover, note that the sums of α3 + α4 is 0.95 which suggests a high degree of interest rate smoothing.
However, as noted above, we also include the output principal component, labor market principal component,
and the growth rate of the uncertainty index in the reaction function of the central bank. As such, we estimate
𝑖𝑡 = (𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜋𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑦𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛼5𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡_𝑝𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟_𝑝𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀t) . (2)
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Table 2: Linear Taylor rules.
Start End α 0 α 1 α 2 α 3 α 4 α 5 α 6 α 7 Aic Bic
Panel A : Baseline Taylor rule:
it = (α0 + α1πt + α2yt + α3it−1 + α4it−2 + εt)
1985:01 2008:02 0.01 0.081 0.17 1.49 −0.54 −207.08
0.16 1.69 5.05 23.39 −9.39
Panel B: Taylor rule including principal components:
it = (α0 + α1πt + α2yt + α3it−1 + α4it−2 + α5output_pct + α6labor_pct + α7uncertaintyt + εt)
1985:01 2008:02 −0.10 0.10 0.11 1.46 −0.51 0.71 0.03 −0.08 −217.65
−0.88 2.41 3.39 25.03 −9.50 3.65 0.15 −1.94
Panel C: Taylor rule: capacity utilization:
it = (α0 + α1πt + α2yt + α3it−1 + α4it−2 + α5capt + α7uncertaintyt + εt)
1985:01 2008:02 −0.13 0.07 0.11 1.47 −0.50 0.40 −0.11 −220.37
−1.17 1.54 4.17 25.8 −9.56 3.77 −2.82
Each of the above panels display linear Taylor rules. The coefficient estimates are displayed in the second row of each panel and
T-statistics are displayed in row 3.
Panel B of Table 2 displays the estimates of (2). A number of features of the estimates in (2) are worth
noting. First, note that the AIC and BIC both suggest that the (2) is a better fit than the traditional Taylor rule.
Again note that the coefficients on inflation (α1) and the real-time output gap (α2) are positive and significant at
conventional levels. Second, α3 + α4 suggests a substantial degree of interest rate smoothing. Third, note that the
coefficient on the output principal component (α5) is large and statistically significant; however, the coefficient
on the labor market principal component is not statistically different from zero. Fourth, note that the coefficient
on the uncertainty index is −0.08 and statistically significant suggesting that increases in uncertainty results
decrease the Federal Funds rate over the Greenspan era.
Obviously, one issue that is not clear in (2) is how to interpret the coefficient on the output principal com-
ponent. As such, in order to better understand the output principal component, we estimate the following:
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡_𝑝𝑐 + 𝜀 (3)
where yi are the output series mentioned in Section 2 and the output_pc is the output principal component.
Table 3 displays the factor loadings from estimating (3). Note in Table 3 that the factor with the largest loading
is CUMFNS which is the Capacity Utilization. As such, we replace the output principal component in (2) with
capacity utilization. Then we re-estimate equation (2) including capacity utilization in place of the output prin-
cipal component and we exclude the labor market principal component because it was not statistically different
from zero. Equation (2) is now
𝑖𝑡 = (𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜋𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑦𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛼5𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀t) . (4)
Table 3: Factor loadings.
W875RX1 0.00338
INDPRO 0.01086
IPFPNSS 0.00891
IPFINAL 0.00837
IPCONGD 0.00707
IPDCONGD 0.02077
IPNCONGD 0.00272
IPBUSEQ 0.01335
IPMAT 0.01311
IPDMAT 0.02088
IPNMAT 0.01204
IPMANSICS 0.0125
IPB51222S 0.00689
IPFUELS 0.00423
CUMFNS 0.99906
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The series represented by these symbols are :real personal income (RPI), real personal income excluding transfer receipts (W875RX1),
(IPFPNSS) IP: Final Products and Nonindustrial Supplies, (IPFINAL) IP: Final Products, (IPCONGD) IP: Consumer Goods, (IPDCONGD)
IP: Durable Consumer Goods, (IPNCONGD) IP: Nondurable Consumer Goods, (IPBUSEQ) IP: Business Equipment, (IPMAT) IP:
Materials, (IPDMAT) IP: Durable Materials, (IPNMAT) IP: Nondurable Materials, (IPMANSICS) IP: Manufacturing, (IPB51222s) IP:
Residential Utilities, (IPFUELS) IP: Fuels, ISM manufacturing (NAPMPI), and capacity utilization (CUMFNS).
Note that in Panel C of Table 2 that the AIC and BIC both suggest that the above Taylor rule is preferred
to those in Panels B and C. In addition, note again, that the coefficients on inflation and output are positive.
Interestingly, the coefficient on inflation is only marginally statistically significant whereas the coefficient on
the output gap and the coefficient on capacity utilization are significant at the 1% level. Moreover, note again
that the coefficient on the uncertainty index is negative (−0.11) and statistically different from zero suggesting
that the Federal Reserve responds to increases in uncertainty by lowering the Federal Funds rate.
4.2 Non-linear Taylor rule estimates
As noted above, Qin and Enders (2008) and Bunzel and Enders (2010) find substantial evidence of nonlinearity
in the Taylor rule over the Greenspan time period. Specifically, in order to estimate the nonlinear Taylor rule,
Bunzel and Enders (2010) estimate the following threshold regression
𝑖𝑡 = (𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜋𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑦𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑖𝑡−2) 𝐼𝑡
+(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜋𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑡−2) (1− 𝐼𝑡) + 𝜀t
(5)
where it, is the quarterly Federal Funds rate, πt is the chain weighted GDP deflator inflation rate over the past
four quarters, yt is the real-time output gap, xt−d is the magnitude of the threshold variable in period t – d and
the Heaviside indicator It = 1 if xt−d > τ and It = 0 otherwise. The threshold value τ is obtained by a grid search
over all possible values of xt−d where each regime is forced to contain at minimum of 25% of the observations
in the sample. Because τ is a nuisance parameter, statistical significance between the coefficients in the two
regimes are determined by Hansen’s (1997) bootstrapped F-statistic.
As noted above, we take the best fitting linear model (4) and use the Bunzel and Enders (2010) nonlinear
methodology. Thus we estimate the following:
𝑖𝑡 = (𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜋𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑦𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛼5𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀t)𝐼𝑡
+(𝛽1𝜋𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽5𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑡) (1− 𝐼𝑡) + 𝜀t
(6)
where it, is the quarterly Federal Funds rate, πt is the PCE inflation rate, yt is the real-time output gap, capt
is the change in capacity utilization, uncertaintyt is percentage change in the Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012)
uncertainty index, xt−d is the magnitude of the threshold variable in period t – d and the Heavyside indicator
It = 1 if xt−d > τ and It = 0 otherwise. We estimate (6) using three different threshold variables. First, we follow
Bunzel and Enders (2010) and estimate their original model using πt−1; second, we estimate (6) using πt−1; third,
we use capacity utilization capt−1; fourth, we use uncertaintyt−1; and fifth, we use the labor_pct−1.
Table 4 Panel A displays the results from estimating (5) using the threshold variable (one lag of inflation) as
in Bunzel and Enders (2010); Table 4 Panel B displays the results from estimating (6) using one lag of inflation as
the threshold variable; Table 4 Panel C displays the results from estimating (6) using one lag of the uncertainty
index as the threshold variable; Table 4 Panel D displays the results from using one lag of capacity utilization as
the threshold variable and Table 4 Panel E displays the results fromusing the labormarket principal component
as the threshold variable. The threshold value, τ, is listed along with the coefficient estimates and the AIC. The
alpha (α) coefficients display the Taylor rule coefficients when the model is above the threshold value (τ) and
the beta (β) display the results when the model is below the threshold value. Specifically, α1 and β1 are the coef-
ficients on inflation, α2 and β2 are the measure on the real-time output gap, and α3, α4, β3, β4 are the coefficients
on lags of the federal funds rate in the respective regimes, α5 and β5 are the coefficients on capacity utilization
and α7 and β7 are the coefficients on the uncertainty index. As can be seen from Table 4, even though we use
PCE inflation rather than the GDP deflator, our results are similar to those of Bunzel and Enders’s (2010) when
estimating their model.
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The first thing to note in comparison of the AIC’s from Table 2 and Table 4 is that the linear model including
capacity utilization and uncertainty has a better model fit than the nonlinear model in Panel of A. Note that the
AIC in Panel C of Table 2 is −220.37 whereas the AIC of the nonlinear model in Panel A and Panel E of Table
4 is −217.83 and −216.67, respectively. However, all of the nonlinear models perform better than the linear
traditional Taylor rule in Panel A of Table 2. Note also that the AIC in the nonlinear models in Panels A through
D suggest that the nonlinear Taylor rule including capacity utilization and uncertainty perform better than the
nonlinear model in which they are excluded. Using the labor market principal component as the threshold
variable as displayed in Panel E resulted in the worst model fit. The best model according to the AIC is the
model in Panel B when lagged inflation is used as the threshold variable. As such, we focus our discussion on
the results from Panel B.
Somewhat surprisingly, note in Panel B that the threshold value is 2.02 very close to the explicit target
noted by Bernanke in the introduction. Moreover, note that all of the coefficients are statistically significant at
conventional levels with the exception of β5 which is the coefficient on capacity utilization when the model is in
the low inflation regime. In the regime in which inflation is higher than 2.02%, the coefficient (α1) on inflation
is 0.18 (and significant at conventional levels), the coefficient (α2) on the output gap is 0.16 and statistically
significant. Note that α3 + α4 is 0.96 which suggests a high degree of interest rate persistence. Interestingly, note
that the coefficient on capacity utilization (α5) is 0.38 and statistically significant. Moreover, note also that the
coefficient on the uncertainty index is−0.13 and statistically significant as well. In the low inflation regime, note
that the coefficient on the inflation rate is 0.27 and statistically significant. Note that the Federal Funds rate is
highly persistent in the low inflation regime as well. The starkest difference in the two regimes is the coefficient
on capacity utilization in the low regime falls to−0.05 and is not statistically different from zero suggesting that
when inflation is low the Federal Reserve does not respond to increases in capacity utilization. Finally, note as
well that the Federal Reserve responds to increases uncertainty by cutting interest rates as demonstrated by the
−0.18 coefficient.
4.3 Forecast performance
While the AICs in Table 2 and Table 4 suggests that the model in Panel B of Table 4 is the best model, we
also chose to evaluate four representative models by evaluating their out of sample forecasting capabilities.
As such, we estimate recursive out-of-sample forecasts to compare the these four models. Our out-of-sample
forecasts began in 2000Q1 and ended in 2008Q2 time period. Again, similar to Bunzel and Enders, given that
we use the contemporaneous values of inflation, we perform an out-of-sample forecasting exercise in order
to corroborate our in-sample findings. Given that we use the contemporaneous values of inflation, the output
gap, capacity utilization, and the uncertainty index it is not possible to obtain a forecast for the federal funds
rate in t + 1 without forecasting the other contemporaneous variables as well. As such, evaluating forecasts
become problematic because any differences in the forecasting performance of the various functional forms of
the Taylor rule might be due to the method used to forecast the contemporaneous variables. As such, we follow
Bunzel and Enders and adopt “backward-looking” variants of the Taylor rule to circumvent this problem.
We compare the following four different variants of the backwards looking Taylor rule. First, we consider a
simple linear Taylor rule:
𝑖𝑡 = (𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜀t) (7)
Second, we consider an augmented linear Taylor rule which simply includes capacity utilization and the un-
certainty index
𝑖𝑡 = (𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛼5𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝛼7𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜀t) (8)
Third, we estimate the following simple nonlinear Taylor rule
𝑖𝑡 = (𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜀t)𝐼𝑡
+(𝛽1𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑡−2) (1− 𝐼𝑡) + 𝜀t
(9)
and finally we estimate an augmented nonlinear Taylor rule
𝑖𝑡 = (𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛼5𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝛼7𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜀t)𝐼𝑡
+(𝛽1𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽5𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑡−1) (1− 𝐼𝑡) + 𝜀t
(10)
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We compare the 1-step-ahead forecasts for the above four models over the 2000Q2–2008Q2 time period. That is,
in order to obtain our first 1-step-ahead forecast, we estimate each of the above fourmodels using data spanning
the 1985Q1–2000Q1 time period; we subsequently obtain 1-step-ahead forecasts and then repeat the procedure
expanding the estimation window by one quarter to obtain the next 1-step-ahead forecasts.
Figure 2 displays the actual federal funds rate as well as the 1-step-ahead forecasts for each model. Table 5
displays the mean square error (MSE) as well as the root mean square error (RMSE) for the four models. First,
note that both nonlinear models have lower MSE and RMSE than either of the linear models, which suggests
that the nonlinear models produce superior forecasts. Additionally, note that the augmented nonlinear Taylor
rule has a MSE of 0.05 and RMSE of 0.22 compared to the 0.06 and 0.24 of the nonlinear Taylor rule. While
the nonlinear models appear to perform better, we also implement the Diebold-Mariano test to compare the
forecasts of the four different models. First, we compare the forecasts of the Linear Taylor rule with the forecasts
of the augmented linear Taylor rule. The Diebold-Mariano test results in a t-statistic of 1.09 and a p-value of 0.13
whichmean that we cannot reject the linear Taylor rule forecasts in favor of the augmented Taylor rule forecasts.
Second, given that we do not find a preference in the forecasts between the two linear models, we compare the
results of the linear Taylor rule with those of the nonlinear and augmented nonlinear Taylor rules. Comparison
of the linear Taylor rule forecasts and nonlinear Taylor rule forecasts results in a Diebold Mariano statistic of
2.60which is significant at the 99% level; theDiebold-Mariano statistic comparing the linear Taylor rulewith the
augmented nonlinear Taylor rule was 2.31 which is also statistically significant at the 99% level which suggests
that the forecasts of the nonlinear Taylor rule models are preferred to those of the linear model. Finally, we
compare the forecasts from the nonlinear Taylor rule with those of the augmented nonlinear Taylor rule; the
Diebold-Marino statistic is 0.87 which suggests that we cannot reject the forecasts of the nonlinear Taylor rule
model in favor of the forecasts of the augmented nonlinear Taylor rule.
Figure 2: Output gap and labor factor.
Table 5: Forecasts statistics.
Start End MSE RMSE
Panel A: Linear Taylor rule
2000:01 2008:02 0.09 0.30
Panel B: Augmented linear Taylor rule
1985:01 2008:02 0.07 0.28
Panel C: Nonlinear Taylor rule
1985:01 2008:02 0.06 0.24
Panel D: Augmented nonlinear Taylor rule
1985:01 2008:02 0.05 0.22
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Each of the above panels display the forecasting statistics from the above models. The mean square error (MSE) and root mean squared
error (RMSE) are displayed in columns 3 and 4.
5 Conclusion
Given the recent clarifications of the Federal Reserve regarding their policy goals and targets, we re-estimated
Taylor rules over the 1985–2008 time period. We find substantial evidence that the Federal Reserve responded
to increases in macroeconomic uncertainty by cutting the Federal Funds rate by approximately 10 basis points.
Moreover, we also found evidence that the Federal Reserve responded aggressively to increases in capacity
utilization, especially when the inflation rate was above 2%. Similar to Bunzel and Enders (2010) we find sub-
stantial evidence suggesting that the Federal Reserve follows a nonlinear Taylor rule and that lagged inflation
served as the best threshold variable. Our estimates of the inflation threshold were 2.02% when using PCE in-
flation in the estimated Taylor rules. Moreover, similar to Bunzel and Enders (2010) the nonlinear models we
estimated result in better in-sample fit statistics as well as lower forecast errors. However, we were not able to
draw a statistical difference between the forecasts of the nonlinear Taylor rule and our augmented nonlinear
Taylor rule which included capacity utilization as well as the uncertainty index.
Our findings bear a number of important poicy implications. For example, we find in Panel B of Table 4 that
the responses of the Federal Reserve to the output gap and capacity utilization are both insignificant (with even
negative point estimates) when the inflation rate is below the threshold value (2.02%). This seems to suggest
that Federal Reserve does not respond as aggressively to the output target variable when the inflation rate is
low as when the inflation rate is high. Second, the responses of the policy rate to the uncertainty index are
negative in both the high and low inflation rate regimes, although this response is barely significant during
the low inflation regime. This result lends support to the belief of “Greenspan put.” Such an implicit policy
insurance to the financial market might have led to the potential moral hazard and possible excessive risk-
taking behaviours.
Notes
1 Lehman Brothers collapsed in September 15, 2008 and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were taken into conservatorship in the third quarter
of 2008.
2 All regressions are estimated using (Eicker-White) robust standard errors.
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